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In February 2009, at the suggestion of Fred Zacharias and the invitation of Professor
Orly Lobel, I had the opportunity visit the University of San Diego School of Law, to
present a paper on legal ethics at a faculty colloquium. I spent most of the day with
Fred. At one point in the afternoon, Fred calmly mentioned that he had to go to the
doctor. He gave me a draft of one of his articles to read, and he opened his office for me
to work. Fred soon returned, and for the rest of the evening he remained, typically,
gracious and hospitable. Tragically, it turned out to be the last time I saw Fred.
I am honored to participate in this tribute to Fred’s memory, and in choosing the topic
of the ethical duty to self, I aim not only to incorporate important elements of Fred’s
scholarship, but also to highlight the sense of personal integrity that Fred embodied.
Earlier versions of this essay were presented at the Legal Ethics Shmooze, hosted by
Fordham Law School, and as a public lecture at Loyola University Maryland. I thank
Bruce Green, Graham McAleer, Russ Pearce, Tom Shaffer, Bill Simon, Larry Solum,
and David Wilkins for helpful discussions. I thank Fraida Liba, Yehudah, Aryeh, Rachel, and
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I. INTRODUCTION
For many years, one of the most prominent areas of ethics scholarship
has revolved around questions of professional identity.1 Indeed, for
more than one hundred years, American lawyers have explored the
implications of their status as professionals, in the process distinguishing
themselves from various other occupations and vocations.2
Notably, though, efforts to identify the salient features of the lawyer’s
professional identity have produced widely varying definitions of legal
professionalism. As Fred Zacharias memorably observed in a 1995 article:
“No term in the legal lexicon has been more abused than ‘professionalism.’
Because lawyers typically are presumed to fit the model of professionals,
the term often is used to mean no more than ‘to act as we want lawyers
to act.’ This concept varies with the speaker.”3 Moreover, a number of
scholars have rejected the notion that lawyers should embrace
professionalism as a positive and ethically meaningful expression of
legal practice,4 while others have questioned a “standard conception” of
lawyering that adopts zealous advocacy as the primary ethical
characterization of the lawyer’s work.5
These critiques have resulted in a rethinking of the role and identity of
lawyers, producing alternative models that take into account principles
such as public justice and morality as well as the lawyer’s personal
1. See, e.g., Fred C. Zacharias, Reconciling Professionalism and Client Interests,
36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1303 (1995).
2. See Samuel J. Levine, Rediscovering Julius Henry Cohen and the Origins of
the Business/Profession Dichotomy: A Study in the Discourse of Early Twentieth
Century Legal Professionalism, 47 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 1, 25–29 (2005).
3. Zacharias, supra note 1, at 1307 (footnote omitted).
4. See, e.g., Rob Atkinson, A Dissenter’s Commentary on the Professionalism
Crusade, 74 TEX. L. REV. 259 (1995); Robert F. Cochran, Jr., Professionalism in the
Postmodern Age: Its Death, Attempts at Resuscitation, and Alternate Sources of Virtue,
14 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 305 (2000); Samuel J. Levine, Faith in Legal
Professionalism: Believers and Heretics, 61 MD. L. REV. 217 (2002); Russell G. Pearce,
The Professionalism Paradigm Shift: Why Discarding Professional Ideology Will
Improve the Conduct and Reputation of the Bar, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1229 (1995); Patrick
J. Schiltz, On Being a Happy, Healthy, and Ethical Member of an Unhappy, Unhealthy,
and Unethical Profession, 52 VAND. L. REV. 871 (1999); Thomas L. Shaffer, Inaugural
Howard Lichtenstein Lecture in Legal Ethics: Lawyer Professionalism as a Moral Argument,
26 GONZ. L. REV. 393 (1991); Richard Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals: Some
Moral Issues, 5 HUM. RTS. 1 (1975).
5. See, e.g., DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY xix–xxi
(1988); William H. Simon, The Ethics of Criminal Defense, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1703,
1703 (1993):
A large literature has emerged in recent years challenging the standard
conception of adversary advocacy that justifies the lawyer in doing anything
arguably legal to advance the client’s ends. This literature has proposed variations
on an ethic that would increase the lawyer’s responsibilities to third parties, the
public, and substantive ideals of legal merit and justice.
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religious and ethical values. Leading theorists have presented a variety
of alternative frameworks, ranging from methods of legal interpretation6
to philosophical and sociological inquiry7 to a religious lawyering
movement.8 Not surprisingly, however, although these innovative
approaches have gained many adherents, they have also attracted
criticism.9 In addition to the criticism that often accompanies new and
innovative ideas, lawyering models that place too much emphasis on
personal values seem vulnerable to the charge that they veer too far from
the doctrinal law that governs the work of lawyers, and therefore they do
not offer viable alternatives.10 For example, numerous provisions and

6. See, e.g., Heidi Li Feldman, Codes and Virtues: Can Good Lawyers Be Good
Ethical Deliberators?, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 885 (1996); Serena Stier, Legal Ethics: The
Integrity Thesis, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 551 (1991); Maura Strassberg, Taking Ethics
Seriously: Beyond Positivist Jurisprudence in Legal Ethics, 80 IOWA L. REV. 901 (1995).
7. See, e.g., WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE: A THEORY OF
LAWYERS’ ETHICS (1998); David Luban, The Adversary System Excuse, in THE GOOD
LAWYER: LAWYERS’ ROLES AND LAWYERS’ ETHICS 83 (David Luban ed., 1983); Gerald
J. Postema, Moral Responsibility in Professional Ethics, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 63 (1980);
Murray L. Schwartz, The Professionalism and Accountability of Lawyers, 66 CALIF. L.
REV. 669 (1978).
8. See, e.g., AALS Section on Professional Responsibility 2006 Annual Meeting
Papers, 21 J.L. & RELIGION 265, 265–314 (2006); Colloquium, Can the Ordinary
Practice of Law Be a Religious Calling?, 32 PEPP. L. REV. 373 (2005); Rose Kent,
What’s Faith Got To Do With It?, FORDHAM LAW., Summer 2001, at 10, available at
http://law.fordham.edu/assets/LawReligion/rel-2WhatFaithGottoDoWithIt.pdf; Howard
Lesnick, Riding the Second Wave of the So-Called Religious Lawyering Movement, 75
ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 283, 283–87 (2001); Russell G. Pearce & Amelia J. Uelmen,
Religious Lawyering in a Liberal Democracy: A Challenge and an Invitation, 55 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 127 (2004); Symposium, Rediscovering the Role of Religion in the Lives
of Lawyers and Those They Represent, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 821 (1999); Symposium,
27 TEX. TECH L. REV. 911 (1996); Symposium on Law & Politics as Vocation, 20 NOTRE
DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 1 (2006); Symposium on Lawyering and Personal
Values—Responding to the Problems of Ethical Schizophrenia, 38 CATH. LAW. 145
(1998); Symposium, The Relevance of Religion to a Lawyer’s Work: An Interfaith
Conference, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 1075 (1998); Robert K. Vischer, Heretics in the
Temple of Law: The Promise and Peril of the Religious Lawyering Movement, 19 J.L. &
RELIGION 427 (2004); Gerry Whyte, Integrating Professional Practice and Religious
Faith: The Religious Lawyering Movement, 55 DOCTRINE & LIFE 18 (2005).
9. See, e.g., Review Essay Symposium: The Practice of Justice by William H.
Simon, 51 STAN. L. REV. 867 (1999); Monroe H. Freedman, A Critique of Philosophizing
About Lawyers’ Ethics (Hofstra Univ. Legal Studies Research Paper No. 11-07, 2011),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1776345##; Ted
Schneyer, Moral Philosophy’s Standard Misconception of Legal Ethics, 1984 WIS. L.
REV. 1529.
10. See, e.g., Bruce A. Green, The Religious Lawyering Critique, 21 J.L. & RELIGION
283 (2006) [hereinafter Green, The Religious Lawyering Critique]; Bruce A. Green, The
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comments in both the Model Code of Professional Responsibility and the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct accept the primacy of zealous
advocacy, expressly or implicitly, as an underlying and guiding policy.11
Alternative methods of lawyering often seem to require a rejection of
these and other basic premises.
Responding, in part, to some of these objections and drawing heavily
on Fred’s scholarship, this essay briefly considers the lawyer’s ethical
duty to self. Although the concept of a “duty to self” has been explored
in philosophical12 and religious scholarship,13 less attention has been

Role of Personal Values in Professional Decisionmaking, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 19
(1997) [hereinafter Green, Personal Values].
11. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. (2010) (“As advocate, a
lawyer zealously asserts the client’s position under the rules of the adversary system.”);
id. (describing various functions of lawyer as representative of client, including
“seek[ing] a result advantageous to the client”); id. (expecting the lawyer, as “a representative
of clients,” to “be a zealous advocate on behalf of a client”); id. R. 1.3, cmt. 1 (“A lawyer
must also act . . . with zeal in advocacy upon the client’s behalf.”); MODEL CODE OF PROF’L
RESPONSIBILITY Canon 7 (1986) (“A Lawyer Should Represent a Client Zealously
Within the Bounds of the Law.”).
12. See, e.g., Keith Bustos, Defending a Kantian Conception of Duties to Self and
Others, 42 J. VALUE INQUIRY 241 (2008); J.M. Finnis, Legal Enforcement of “Duties to
Oneself”: Kant v. Neo-Kantians, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 433 (1987); Diane Jeske,
Perfection, Happiness, and Duties to Self, 33 AM. PHIL. Q. 263, 272 (1996); Margaret
Paton, A Reconsideration of Kant’s Treatment of Duties to Oneself, 40 PHIL. Q. 222
(1990); Marcus G. Singer, On Duties to Oneself, 69 ETHICS 202 (1959); Warner Wick,
More About Duties to Oneself, 70 ETHICS 158 (1960); Josh Glasgow, It’s Easy Being Me:
Duties to Self, PEA SOUP (Aug. 26, 2004), http://peasoup.typepad.com/peasoup/2004/
08/its_easy_being_.html.
13. For example, Rabbi Hershel Schachter enumerates a number of different sources of
responsibility in Jewish law, including duties between a person and God, interpersonal
duties, and duties between a person and one’s self. HERSHEL SCHACHTER, B’IKVEI HATZON 87 (1997) (citing RABBI ELIJAH OF VILNA, COMMENTARY TO PROVERBS (1:2)).
Rabbi Schachter further connects the concept of duty to self with the imperative of
imitatio Dei, which in turn is based on the notion of imago Dei. See id; cf. SHIMON
SHKOP, SHAAREI YOSHER (1925) (Introduction).
Recently, David Luban relied on various sources in Jewish law and tradition that
emphasize the significance of human dignity, premised on the notion of imago Dei. See
David Luban, Human Dignity, Humiliation, and Torture, 19 KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J.
211 (2009). Accordingly, Luban articulated a model of legal ethics that takes
into account the dignity of those impacted by the lawyer’s actions, thereby prohibiting a
lawyer from humiliating others. See DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS AND HUMAN DIGNITY
65–95 (2007); cf. Meir Dan-Cohen, A Concept of Dignity (Univ. of Cal. Berkeley Sch. of
Law Working Paper, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1468031; Jeremy Waldron,
The Image of God: Rights, Reason, and Order (N.Y.U. Sch. of Law, Pub. Law & Legal
Theory Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 10-85, 2010), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1718054.
Based on Rabbi Schachter’s insights, perhaps an alternative model of legal ethics
would likewise draw upon the concept of dignity, though rather than focusing on the
lawyer’s interpersonal duties that take into account the dignity of others, the alternative
framework would focus on the lawyer’s own dignity, which gives rise to the lawyer’s
ethical duty to self. Such a duty may similarly prohibit a lawyer from humiliating others,

288

[VOL. 48: 285, 2011]

Taking the Ethical Duty to Self Seriously
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

paid to the role of the ethical duty to self in the work of lawyers. In a
1976 law review article, Professional Ethics and the Lawyer’s Duty to
Self, Professor John Flynn called for “greater concern for the lawyer’s
duty to self.”14 As Flynn stated in his conclusion:
Lawyers face a particularly difficult conflict of irreconcilable role definitions
since they owe duties to their clients, the courts, the profession, and society at large
as well as to themselves. . . . [T]hese role definitions . . . should be weighed in
light of one’s concept of self and those values . . . one perceives as essential to
the maintenance of personal integrity.15

Since the appearance of Flynn’s article, a number of legal scholars,
including, significantly, Fred Zacharias,16 have looked at the lawyer’s
duty to self and its relationship to other ethical obligations.17

though the difference in the source of the duty may likewise suggest a difference in the
precise nature and scope of the duty.
For discussions of the imperative of imitatio Dei in Jewish law, see, for example,
Samuel J. Levine, Halacha and Aggada: Translating Robert Cover’s Nomos and Narrative,
1998 UTAH L. REV. 465, 490–92 & nn.130–35 (citing ABRAHAM R. BESDIN, REFLECTIONS OF
THE RAV: LESSONS IN JEWISH THOUGHT 25–27 (1979) (adapted from lectures of Rabbi
Soloveitchik)). See also HERSHEL SCHACHTER, NEFESH HARAV 63–69 (1994); JOSEPH B.
SOLOVEITCHIK, OUT OF THE WHIRLWIND: ESSAYS ON MOURNING, SUFFERING, AND THE
HUMAN CONDITION 207 (David Shatz et al. eds., 2003) (referring to imitatio Dei as “the
categorical norm within [the Jewish] ethical system”). For a discussion of the relationship
between human dignity and imitatio Dei, see JOSEPH B. SOLOVEITCHIK, THE LONELY
MAN OF FAITH 14–19 (Doubleday 2006) (1965).
14. John J. Flynn, Professional Ethics and the Lawyer’s Duty to Self, 1976 WASH.
U. L.Q. 429, 429.
15. Id. at 444.
16. See Fred C. Zacharias, Specificity in Professional Responsibility Codes:
Theory, Practice, and the Paradigm of Prosecutorial Ethics, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
223, 262 (1993) [hereinafter Zacharias, Specificity in Professional Responsibility Codes]
(advocating that lawyers “engage[] in serious introspection concerning their personal
responsibility to help achieve good results”); see also Fred C. Zacharias, Rethinking
Confidentiality, 74 IOWA L. REV. 351, 372 (1989) [hereinafter Zacharias, Rethinking
Confidentiality] (relying on Flynn and concluding that “[t]he traditional legal and ethical
approaches to the legal profession’s responsibilities tend to distort lawyers’ perceptions
of their own obligations as moral and autonomous individuals”); Fred C. Zacharias,
Rethinking Confidentiality II: Is Confidentiality Constitutional?, 75 IOWA L. REV. 601,
639 n.196 (1990) [hereinafter Zacharias, Rethinking Confidentiality II] (relying on Flynn); id.
(“[C]onfidentiality’s restriction of free expression impacts severely on lawyer integrity. It
enables lawyers to rationalize conduct that would otherwise transgress their moral precepts. It
eliminates their freedom of thought and choice.”); Zacharias, supra note 1, at 1312
(citing Flynn as among scholars who “identify lawyer self-awareness and introspection
as avenues for determining appropriate behavior”).
17. See, e.g., Roberta K. Flowers, What You See Is What You Get: Applying the
Appearance of Impropriety Standard to Prosecutors, 63 MO. L. REV. 699, 738 (1998)
(“The role of professional lawyer requires introspection.”); Susan G. Kupfer, Authentic
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Building on this work, this essay suggests that, although the Model
Rules place substantial emphasis on the lawyer’s duty to the client, the
Model Rules do not advocate a form of ethical monism18 that excludes
consideration of other ethical obligations such as the lawyer’s duty to
self.19 As Zacharias observed in a 1993 article, “the [ethics] codes
clearly endorse a measure of soul searching and discretion by lawyers.”20
In fact, various statements and provisions in the preamble and official
comments to the Model Rules call for a complex form of moral and
ethical reasoning. Thus, this essay borrows, in part, from the analysis
offered by Zacharias in one of his later articles, premised on the insight
that “the very structure of the codes is to provide a framework under
which lawyers can and will act as ordinary moral individuals.”21
Legal Practices, 10 G EO . J. L EGAL E THICS 33, 39 n.17 (1996) (understanding the
lawyer’s duty to self as requiring that “lawyers must develop their own moral
sensibilities and incorporate them into their professional lives”); Reed Elizabeth Loder,
Moral Truthseeking and the Virtuous Negotiator, 8 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 45, 52 (1994)
(discussing “a duty to avoid . . . internal disharmony, a duty to oneself”); John K. Morris,
Power and Responsibility Among Lawyers and Clients: Comment on Ellmann’s Lawyers
and Clients, 34 UCLA L. REV. 781, 784 (1987) (identifying, in addition to the interests
of the client, “other interests in the attorney-client interaction,” including “the attorney’s
interest as an independent moral actor; the interests of third persons who may be
immediately affected by the lawyer’s or the client’s conduct; and the interests of society
as a whole” (footnote omitted)); Mark Spiegel, Lawyering and Client Decisionmaking:
Informed Consent and the Legal Profession, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 41, 117 & n.315 (1979)
(stating that “the lawyer has an interest in not being forced to make decisions that
conflict with either the profession’s or his own code of professional responsibility,” and
defining “[o]ne’s own code” as “the complex of rules that an individual accepts as
governing his behavior as a lawyer,” which “includes personal rules and rules derived
from the profession”); Alice Woolley, Integrity in Zealousness: Comparing the Standard
Conceptions of the Canadian and American Lawyer, 9 CAN. J.L. & JURISPRUDENCE 61,
85 (1996) (citing an “the application of a ‘duty to self . . . to all aspects of a lawyer’s
life’” to ensure that [the lawyer] remains ‘true to himself’” (quoting Mary Meechan,
More Than an Mere Citizen: The Special Responsibilities of the Lawyer in To-Day’s
Society, 14 LAW SOC’Y GAZETTE 284, 292 (1980))).
18. Cf. W. Bradley Wendel, Value Pluralism in Legal Ethics, 78 WASH. U. L.Q.
113 (2000).
19. Wendel’s framework allows for “[a] [l]imited [r]ole for [p]ersonal [v]alues in
[l]egal [e]thics.” Id. at 198–211.
20. See Zacharias, Specificity in Professional Responsibility Codes, supra note 16,
at 259 n.107.
21. Fred C. Zacharias, Integrity Ethics, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 541, 544 (2009)
[Zacharias, Integrity Ethics]; see also Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green,
Reconceptualizing Advocacy Ethics, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 15–16 (2005) (“[T]he
professional ethics codes . . . authorize lawyers to exercise moral restraint.” (footnote omitted));
Zacharias, supra note 1, at 1349 (“[T]he codes in fact accord lawyers significant choice
in selecting tactics, screening arguments, and presenting accurate versions of the facts.”);
id. at 1377 (“Contrary to the view that client-oriented legal ethics codes deprive lawyers
of the discretion to act morally, [this article] suggests that the codes leave ample room
for objective decisionmaking and objective conduct.”); cf. Green, The Religious
Lawyering Critique, supra note 10, at 292 (“[I]t is a vast overstatement to say of the
professional norms that they leave no room for lawyers’ personal morality . . . .”);
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Accordingly, this essay delineates a three-tiered approach that
incorporates not only the lawyer’s duty to the client and to society, but
also the lawyer’s obligation to take into consideration the duty to self,
which includes fidelity to the lawyer’s personal ethical values and
commitments. In addition, rather than placing the various interests in
hierarchical opposition, requiring that one duty invariably prevail over
the others, the three-tiered approach looks to consider ways in which
competing interests might balance or, at times, be reconciled with one
another.22 To illustrate the three-tiered approach to the lawyer’s ethical

Russell G. Pearce, Model Rule 1.0: Lawyers Are Morally Accountable, 70 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1805, 1807 (2002) (“The use of the ethical rules to educate lawyers to their moral
responsibility falls squarely within the purposes of the ethics codes.”); Russell G. Pearce,
Rediscovering the Republican Origins of the Legal Ethics Codes, 6 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 241, 281–82 (1992) (relying on an examination of the origins of legal ethics
codes in George Sharswood’s essays to “support[] a new reading of the legal ethics
codes,” in that “Sharswood’s ethical standards were derived from the lawyer’s
republican role as a public officer exercising independent moral discretion,” and likewise
“the codes in fact continue Sharswood’s approach to the extent that they permit the
lawyer discretion to reject or ignore client instructions”); Ted Schneyer, Professionalism
as Bar Politics: The Making of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 14 LAW &
SOC. INQUIRY 677, 736 (1989) (citing provisions through which the Model Rules “invite
lawyers . . . to take their own values into account”).
22. Cf. Jane B. Baron & Richard K. Greenstein, Constructing the Field of
Professional Responsibility, 15 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 37, 84 (2001)
(“The codes themselves provide that the lawyer owes duties to self, client, and the public
interest without providing any sort of algorithm for resolving conflicts among those
potentially conflicting duties.”); id. at 84–85 n.113 (“Lawyers owe duties to clients, the
justice system, third parties generally, opposing parties, the society, and the profession.
There is a hierarchy among these duties, but all difficult legal ethics questions involve an
attempted balancing among these duties. The law governing lawyers, at least the profession’s
self-regulation/rules, are essentially an attempted balance among the competing duties in
given contexts.” (quoting JAMES E. MOLITERNO, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW
GOVERNING LAWYERS 2 (2000))); id. (“[I]n an important sense, any rules of professional
conduct are an attempt to accommodate at least five interests . . . (1) lawyers as individuals,
(2) lawyers in their relationships with each other, (3) lawyers’ responsibilities to their
clients, (4) lawyers’ responsibilities to non-clients with whom the lawyer deals, and (5)
institutions of the legal system through which the lawyer works.” (quoting THOMAS D.
MORGAN & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: PROBLEMS AND
MATERIALS 28 (7th ed. 2000))); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Law, Ethics and Mystery, 82 U.
DET. MERCY L. REV. 509, 512–13 (2005) (“[S]erious ethical dilemmas typically involve,
not questions of distinguishing right from wrong, but deciding upon the priority between
obligations emanating from different normative realms that dictate inconsistent courses
of action. Lawyers deal all the time with actual or apparent inconsistencies in legal rules.
People in ordinary life also confront similar inconsistencies. A continuing responsibility in
real life is resolving, accommodating, or somehow adjusting to these inconsistencies.”);
Paton, supra note 12, at 229 (analyzing Kant’s treatment of duty to self vis-à-vis other
duties and concluding that a “ranking of obligations [in order of importance] would be
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obligations, this essay focuses on the lawyer’s duty of confidentiality.23
In so doing, this essay both expressly and implicitly relies yet again on
the work of Fred Zacharias, whose pioneering articles raised basic and
crucial questions about the duty of confidentiality,24 while his later
scholarship continued to explore the issue of confidentiality in the
context of a variety of areas of legal ethics.25
purely mechanical and arbitrary”); Wendel, supra note 18, at 114–17 (identifying a
number of “foundational normative values of lawyering,” including “loyalty to one’s client,
social justice, fidelity to a set of legal norms, or, most recently, interpersonal considerations
such as care, mercy, and connectedness,” and concluding that “the lawyer seeking to act
ethically must take account of different value claims that may not be comparable with
one another in an impersonally rational, mathematical, or algorithmic manner”).
23. See Limor Zer-Gutman, Revising the Ethical Rules of Attorney-Client
Confidentiality: Towards a New Discretionary Rule, 45 LOY. L. REV. 669, 676 (1999)
(identifying a “‘hierarchy of protection’” within the rules of confidentiality, placing “the
courts and lawyers on top, clients a close second, and society and third parties far behind
at the unprotected end of the spectrum”); cf. Rachel Vogelstein, Note, Confidentiality vs.
Care: Re-Evaluating the Duty to Self, Client, and Others, 92 GEO. L.J. 153 (2003). In an
effort to balance different interests implicated by the duty of confidentiality, Zer-Gutman
proposes a new discretionary rule that “requires consideration of all the relevant circumstances
of a particular case, with various factors and competing interests being weighed.” ZerGutman, supra, at 704.
Similarly, in a number of his later articles, Zacharias explored the nature of “permissive” or
discretionary rules, suggesting that such rules may “presuppose that lawyers will
exercise professional conscience in deciding how to act in individual cases within the
category identified by the rule.” Zacharias & Green, supra note 21, at 52; see also Bruce
A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias, Permissive Rules of Professional Conduct, 91 MINN. L.
REV. 265, 281–87 (2006) [hereinafter Green & Zacharias, Permissive Rules] (characterizing
“permissive rules” as “regulated discretion”); Fred C. Zacharias, Coercing Clients: Can
Lawyer Gatekeeper Rules Work?, 47 B.C. L. REV. 455, 495 (2006) [hereinafter,
Zacharias, Coercing Clients] (“Other rules simply give lawyers discretion to act, which
allows lawyers to base their decisions on personal, potentially venal, incentives.”
(footnote omitted)); Fred C. Zacharias, The Images of Lawyers, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
73, 99 (2007) [hereinafter Zacharias, Images of Lawyers] (“The codes do not tell lawyers
how to behave in situations implicated by the discretionary rules, though some observers
might believe that particular conduct sometimes is required or that, at a minimum,
lawyers must exercise their discretion in accordance with the spirit of the rules.”
(footnote omitted)); cf. Samuel J. Levine, Taking Ethical Discretion Seriously: Ethical
Deliberation as Ethical Obligation, 37 IND. L. REV. 21 (2003); Patrick Santos, Why the
ABA Should Permit Lawyers To Use Their Get-Out-of-Jail Free Card: A Theoretical and
Empirical Analysis, 31 U. LA VERNE L. REV. 151, 189 (2009) (“A lawyer’s professional
responsibility necessarily carries with it a duty to exercise discretion by considering the
relevant legal issues.”).
24. Zacharias, Rethinking Confidentiality, supra note 16; Zacharias, Rethinking
Confidentiality II, supra note 16.
25. See, e.g., Green & Zacharias, Permissive Rules, supra note 23; Zacharias,
Coercing Clients, supra note 23, at 476–78; Fred C. Zacharias, Fact and Fiction in the
Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers: Should the Confidentiality Provisions
Restate the Law?, 6 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 903 (1993); Fred C. Zacharias, Harmonizing
Privilege and Confidentiality, 41 S. TEX. L. REV. 69 (1999); Zacharias, Integrity Ethics,
supra note 21, at 562–65; Fred C. Zacharias, Privilege and Confidentiality in California,
28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 367 (1995); Fred C. Zacharias, Steroids and Legal Ethics Codes:
Are Lawyers Rational Actors?, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 671, 693–95 (2010) [hereinafter
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II. THE THREE-TIERED FRAMEWORK OF ETHICAL RESPONSIBILITIES:
THE PREAMBLE TO THE MODEL RULES
The opening section of the Model Rules is titled “Preamble: A
Lawyer’s Responsibilities.”26 Although this section does not present a
systematic analysis of the lawyer’s varying responsibilities, the preamble
acknowledges the lawyer’s multiple—and, at times, conflicting—
sources of ethical responsibility, including not only ethics rules and
other law, but also the lawyer’s “personal conscience” and the “legal
profession’s ideals of public service.”27
To be sure, the preamble adopts an approach that often accepts the
primacy of the lawyer’s duty of zealous advocacy.28 Yet, the preamble
seemingly implies that the general preference for zealous advocacy is
based in practical and utilitarian—albeit, arguably dubious—assumptions
about the adversary system, rather than in acceptance of zealous
advocacy as an inherently overriding value.
As the preamble declares:
A lawyer’s responsibilities as a representative of clients, an officer of the legal
system and a public citizen are usually harmonious. Thus, when an opposing
party is well represented, a lawyer can be a zealous advocate on behalf of a
client and at the same time assume that justice is being done.29

The preamble acknowledges, however, that “[i]n the nature of law
practice . . . conflicting responsibilities are encountered.”30 In fact,
“[v]irtually all difficult ethical problems arise from conflict between a
lawyer’s responsibilities to clients, to the legal system and to the
lawyer’s own interest in remaining an ethical person while earning a
satisfactory living.”31 Thus, the preamble to the Model Rules expressly

Zacharias, Steroids and Legal Ethics Codes]; Fred C. Zacharias, The Lawyer as Conscientious
Objector, 54 RUTGERS L. REV. 191 (2001) [hereinafter Zacharias, Lawyer as Conscientious
Objector].
26. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. (2010).
27. Id. para. 7.
28. See id. para. 2 (describing various functions of lawyer as representative of
client, including “zealously assert[ing] the client’s position,” and “seek[ing] a result
advantageous to the client”); id. para. 8 (expecting the lawyer, as “a representative of
clients,” to “be a zealous advocate on behalf of a client”).
29. Id. para. 8. W. Bradley Wendel has characterized this and similar statements
as having a “utopian ring,” owing to an “implicit monism [that] promise[s] a decision procedure
that avoids the tragedy of inevitable wrongdoing.” Wendel, supra note 18, at 115–16.
30. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. para. 9.
31. Id.
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recognizes at least three duties that play a role in the lawyer’s work and
identity: the duty to the client, the duty to justice, and the duty to self—
to the lawyer’s interest in remaining faithful to personal and ethical
values.32
The preamble then asserts that the Model Rules “often prescribe terms
for resolving such conflicts” but that there remain “many difficult issues
of professional discretion [that] must be resolved through the exercise of
sensitive professional and moral judgment guided by the basic principles
underlying the Rules.”33 Notably, though, in identifying these underlying
principles, the preamble does not delineate the three aforementioned
duties but instead refers to the “lawyer’s obligation zealously to protect
and pursue a client’s legitimate interests.”34 Almost as an afterthought,
the preamble adds that the lawyer must act “within the bounds of the
law, while maintaining a professional, courteous and civil attitude
toward all persons involved in the legal system.”35 Significantly, these
broad references to following the law and maintaining civility do not
provide an articulation of an identifiable responsibility to justice, let
alone any hint of a duty to self, that might counterbalance or temper the
duty of zealous advocacy.
Nevertheless, there remains substantial language in the preamble to
the Model Rules acknowledging the lawyer’s duty to self, expressed
through the lawyer’s personal and ethical values. This duty stands as an
important component of the lawyer’s professional identity and
responsibility, one that informs ethical deliberations and decision
making when a lawyer is confronted with conflicting responsibilities.
III. THE FRAMEWORK APPLIED: THE DUTY OF CONFIDENTIALITY
The three-tiered framework of ethical responsibilities—to the client, to
justice, and to self—may prove helpful in descriptive and normative
discussions of ethical dilemmas. For example, one of the most
prominent—and, at times, most controversial—areas of debate among
both ethics scholars and practicing lawyers revolves around the lawyer’s
duty of confidentiality. In one of his final articles, Zacharias observed
32. Cf. Zacharias, Specificity in Professional Responsibility Codes, supra note 16,
at 259 n.107 (citing preamble to code as “clearly endors[ing] a measure of soul searching
and discretion by lawyers”); cf. also Douglas L. Colbert, Professional Responsibility in
Crisis, 51 HOWARD L.J. 677, 685 (2008) (stating that “the Preamble speaks to lawyers’
ethical societal values”); id. at 708–09 (describing the preamble’s recognition of a
lawyer’s various duties to society); Santos, supra note 23, at 178 (noting the competing
duties recognized by the preamble to the Model Rules).
33. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. para. 9.
34. Id.
35. Id.
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that “rules involving confidentiality exceptions have been among the
most fiercely debated in the code-drafting process.”36 Or, as he
succinctly—though somewhat understatedly—put it: “lawyers seem to
care about them a lot.”37
The organized bar has consistently characterized the duty to maintain
client confidences as one of the central components of the attorney-client
relationship.38 Indeed, it seems intuitive that a client’s interests will be
best served if the client is guaranteed that conversations with the lawyer
will remain confidential. As the official comment to Model Rule 1.6
asserts: “The client is thereby encouraged to seek legal assistance and to
communicate fully and frankly with the lawyer even as to embarrassing
or legally damaging subject matter. The lawyer needs this information
to represent the client effectively and, if necessary, to advise the client to
refrain from wrongful conduct.”39 Although Zacharias and others have
questioned the empirical grounds for the degree of confidentiality
prescribed by the rule,40 this comment captures the conventional wisdom
behind the function of the duty of confidentiality.
As a basic matter, the rules of confidentiality require that the lawyer
protect the interests of the client, notwithstanding the inherently
detrimental effect on potentially valid interests of the client’s adversary,
as well as, under most circumstances, any negative effect on innocent
and uninvolved third parties. This sometimes troubling aspect of
confidentially has led Zacharias and other ethics scholars to “rethink”
confidentiality,41 questioning both the primacy and the scope of the duty.
For example, some scholars have presented alternative theories that

36. Zacharias, Steroids and Legal Ethics Codes, supra note 25, at 694.
37. Id.
38. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R 1.6. cmt. 2 (2010) (“A fundamental
principle in the client-lawyer relationship is that, in the absence of the client’s informed
consent, the lawyer must not reveal information relating to the representation. . . . This
contributes to the trust that is the hallmark of the client-lawyer relationship.”).
39. Id.
40. See Zacharias, Rethinking Confidentiality, supra note 16; see also STEPHEN
GILLERS, REGULATION OF LAWYERS: PROBLEMS OF LAW AND ETHICS 37 (8th ed. 2009)
(“The trouble with the empirical argument is that it is based on an intuition—or some
would say common sense—about how people will behave. But we have no rigorous test
of this intuition.”).
41. See Zacharias, Rethinking Confidentiality, supra note 16; Zacharias, Rethinking
Confidentiality II, supra note 16.
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focus on the lawyer’s countervailing duties to justice42 and to self.43 In
partial response to these concerns, the Model Rules permit lawyers to
reveal confidences in certain exceptional scenarios.44 Nevertheless, in
most situations, the confidentiality rules consistently place paramount
the lawyer’s duty to the client over those to justice or to self.
Apparently dissatisfied or uncomfortable with a stance that virtually
ignores the lawyer’s other duties, the ABA included in the preamble an
attempt to respond to these objections. Again, however, the response
reads like an afterthought and proves unconvincing. The preamble states
that “a lawyer can be sure that preserving client confidences ordinarily
serves the public interest because people are more likely to seek legal
advice, and thereby heed their legal obligations, when they know their
communications will be private.”45 Such as it is, this statement offers
the accurate observation that the public interest is generally served when
a client seeks legal advice.
Notably, however, the statement focuses on only one aspect of
confidentiality, ignoring the prevalent and often more serious effects that
confidentiality may have, to the detriment of both the public and the
lawyer’s own moral identity. In fact, as conceptualized in the preamble,
even the benefit to the “public interest” seems relegated to a secondary
result, a mere by-product of serving the client’s interest in seeking legal
advice.
Thus, notwithstanding the three-tiered framework of the lawyer’s
responsibilities delineated elsewhere in the preamble,46 both the
substantive rules and the commentary set forth a vision of confidentiality
that promotes almost exclusively the client’s interests. This vision, in
turn, is largely consistent with one traditional view of the lawyer’s
professional identity, subjugating the lawyer’s duty to the public and to
the lawyer’s ethical self, in favor of the lawyer’s duty to zealously
promote the best interests of the client.
Indeed, the expansive duty of confidentiality is the focus of an article
in which Zacharias considers “a few scenarios that might implicate a
lawyer’s deeply held beliefs.”47 As Zacharias observed, in many of
these scenarios:

42. See, e.g., SIMON, supra note 7, at 54–62.
43. See, e.g., Russell G. Pearce, To Save a Life: Why a Rabbi and a Jewish Lawyer
Must Disclose a Client Confidence, 29 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1771 (1996).
44. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R 1.6(b) (2010).
45. Id. pmbl. para. 8.
46. See supra Part II.
47. Zacharias, Lawyer as Conscientious Objector, supra note 25, at 196.
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Under the common conception of a lawyer’s role morality, the lawyer must
balance the personal and third-party interests in disclosure against the system’s
interests in maintaining the client’s confidences. The confidentiality rules in the
professional codes provide guidance as to how those interests should be reconciled.
Under the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, for example, the primacy of
maintaining inviolate the attorney-client relationship trumps third-party interests
unless the client’s acts are “criminal” and “likely to result in imminent death or
substantial bodily harm.” How should the lawyer factor in her core belief that
she should not stand idly by while another is injured?48

To be sure, some cases may allow for creative interpretation of
confidentiality rules to permit disclosure, while recent amendments have
expanded the scope of the exceptions to the rules.49 Nevertheless, in
other cases the lawyer is left with stark and difficult choices. As
Zacharias explained:
First, to disclose the information under the rule’s exception, the lawyer would
have to make a knowing decision to manipulate, twist, or misinterpret the rule’s
terms. Alternatively, the lawyer can adopt the mandate of the rule itself as an
equally important core belief. In other words, she can accept that maintaining
confidentiality is as important as, or more important than, preventing injury. . . .
Remaining is the final option . . . to defy the professional rule and to honor the
personal ethical standard over the professional rule.50

In short, as Zacharias put it elsewhere: “[S]trict confidentiality rules
can reduce the bar’s ability and willingness to hear the call of
morality.”51
IV. THE INNOCENT CONVICT
Of the various scenarios in which the rules of confidentiality implicate
the lawyer’s sense of duty to self, the case of the “innocent convict”—in
particular, the innocent convict on death row—stands out as perhaps the
most troubling and, accordingly, one of the most widely discussed.52
The scenario involves a client who, in conversation with a lawyer,
admits to having committed the crime for which an innocent individual
has been convicted and is currently imprisoned; in an extreme case, the
innocent convict is awaiting execution. This scenario may provide a
particularly helpful illustration of the way different perspectives on the
48. Id. at 196–97 (footnote omitted).
49. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(1)–(3).
50. Zacharias, Lawyer as Conscientious Objector, supra note 25, at 198.
51. Zacharias, Rethinking Confidentiality, supra note 16, at 372.
52. See, e.g., SIMON, supra note 7, at 163–64; Symposium, Executing the Wrong
Person: The Professionals’ Ethical Dilemmas, 29 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1543 (1996).

297

lawyer’s role and identity may lead to an emphasis on different aspects
of the lawyer’s three-tiered ethical obligations.53 At the same time,
distinctions between lawyering models need not represent monistic
approaches to legal ethics.54 Instead, each model operates within a
broader recognition that a lawyer’s responsibility is comprised of oftenconflicting duties. However, when such a conflict arises, each of the
models focuses on a different aspect of the lawyer’s responsibility.
For example, although the Model Rules largely adopt a traditional
model of zealous advocacy, they do not ignore the importance of
protecting innocent third parties. Accordingly, the Rules currently
permit disclosure to prevent death or substantial bodily harm.55 As the
comment explains, this exception is intended to “recognize[] the
overriding value of life and physical integrity.”56 Yet, under the precise
contours of the rule, the value of life does not quite override confidentiality.
Instead, the rule retains sufficient allegiance to the interests of the client
to place confidentiality on equal footing with the value of life. Thus, in
a case such as the innocent convict, the rule leaves to the lawyer the
discretion either to disclose confidential information to prevent the death
of an innocent third party or to remain silent in the face of such a result.
In contrast, Bill Simon offers an approach that tempers the duty of
zealous advocacy significantly, calling instead for a “contextual view”
that emphasizes the lawyer’s duty to serve the interests of justice.57
Simon’s model categorizes the death of the innocent convict as a
“substantial injustice,” thereby lying outside the proper bounds of
confidentiality.58 In Simon’s framework, “[i]f the facts are such that
disclosure would probably save an innocent life without posing a
demonstrable threat to important rights of others . . . then it would be
grotesque not to disclose them.”59 Simon does not ignore the importance
of the lawyer’s duty to represent the client’s interests, but the contextual
view places the lawyer’s duty to justice—to prevent “substantial
injustice”—as paramount. Thus, for Simon, the lawyer’s failure to
disclose in such a case would represent “a monumental violation of a
core commitment of [the lawyer’s] role.”60 Nevertheless, the differences
between Simon’s model and the Model Rules may turn on the degree of

53. Cf. Santos, supra note 23, at 178 (“The innocent convict hypothetical . . . pits
three duties against themselves: duty to client, duty to self, and duty to society.”).
54. See supra notes 22–23 and accompanying text.
55. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R 1.6(b)(1) (2010).
56. Id. cmt. para. 6.
57. See SIMON, supra note 7, at 138–69.
58. Id. at 56.
59. Id. at 164.
60. Id.
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emphasis in balancing competing duties and values, rather than constituting
an unbridgeable gap between diametrically opposed attitudes toward the
role of lawyers.
Similarly, the insights of religious lawyering and other systems of
personal values may complement the lawyer’s duties to the client and to
justice. In the words of one leading scholar, rather than conflicting with
other conceptions of the lawyer’s professional obligations, religious
lawyering may “inform or influence a lawyer’s work.”61 Moreover, in
some accounts, “professional and religious norms are ordinarily not
antithetical, but capable of being interwoven.”62
Nevertheless, many proponents of religious lawyering argue
powerfully that other lawyering models fail to take into account the
significance of the lawyer’s duty to self. In scenarios of conflicting
duties, such as the innocent convict, the duty to self may outweigh other
duties and require that the lawyer disclose confidences to save the
innocent third party. Accordingly, some scholars have rejected the
notion that fidelity to the ideals of confidentiality should lead a lawyer to
allow an innocent individual to remain wrongfully incarcerated, while
many have insisted that lawyers must breach confidentiality to save the
life of an innocent death-row convict.63 As Zacharias noted, “[s]ome
observers . . . believe that a lawyer sometimes must act to save a third
party’s life when there are no alternatives even if the professional rules
make the disclosure of confidences in order to do so ‘discretionary.’”64
Of course, arguments for revealing confidences to save the life of the
innocent third party are not exclusively religious in nature. After all,
many value systems would likely reach a similar result,65 as would
61. Green, Personal Values, supra note 10, at 24.
62. Green, The Religious Lawyering Critique, supra note 10, at 287.
63. See, e.g., Robert F. Cochran, Jr., The Rule of Law(yers), 65 MO. L. REV. 571
(2000); Mary C. Daly, To Betray Once? To Betray Twice?: Reflections on Confidentiality, a
Guilty Client, an Innocent Condemned Man, and an Ethics-Seeking Defense Counsel, 29
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1611 (1996); Monroe H. Freedman, Legal Ethics from a Jewish
Perspective, 27 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1131 (1996) [hereinafter Freedman, Legal Ethics from a
Jewish Perspective]; Monroe H. Freedman, The Life-Saving Exception to Confidentiality:
Restating the Law Without the Was, the Will Be, or the Ought To Be, 29 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. 1631 (1996) [hereinafter Freedman, The Life-Saving Exception]; Robert P. Lawry,
Damned and Damnable: A Lawyer’s Moral Duties with Life on the Line, 29 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. 1641 (1996); Samuel J. Levine, Taking Ethical Obligations Seriously: A Look at
American Codes of Professional Responsibility Through a Perspective of Jewish Law
and Ethics, 57 CATH. U. L. REV. 165 (2007); Pearce, supra note 43.
64. Zacharias, Images of Lawyers, supra note 23, at 99 n.123.
65. See Symposium, supra note 52.
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Simon’s contextual view.66 Nevertheless, religious lawyering may stand
out as a particularly powerful illustration of a model in which lawyers
appeal to their own moral conscience as a guide to their ethical
decisionmaking. Thus, though at times reaching the same result as other
models, religious lawyering differs from both the traditional view and
Simon’s model, relying instead on the lawyer’s duty to self as a primary
basis for ethical values and reasoning.
As a final illustration of the three-tiered framework, it may be helpful
to consider the position of Monroe Freedman, who is perhaps the
preeminent scholar identified with the traditional model of zealous
advocacy. As Zacharias put it, Freedman is the scholar who, in modern
times, has “sponsored most fiercely” “the ultra-adversarial norm.”
Under this approach:
[T]he adversarial ethic governs everything else. Lawyers must abide by the law
and codes of ethics—which provide some rules for the adversarial game. But
even these rules should be read and interpreted in light of, and as furthering, a
lawyer’s overriding obligation to serve his client’s interests.67

In fact, Freedman has articulated a vision of client-centered lawyering
and confidentiality—particularly in the work of the criminal defense
attorney—that goes beyond the contours incorporated into the Model
Rules.68 Nevertheless, Freedman was a leading voice in the successful
effort to amend the Model Rules to permit disclosure of confidential
information to prevent the execution of an innocent death-row inmate.69
Freedman expressly acknowledged his religious faith as the basis for this
position, which in some ways runs contrary to his general insistence on
protecting the interests, rights, and confidentiality of the client.70
66. See supra text accompanying notes 57–60.
67. Fred C. Zacharias, Fitting Lying to the Court into the Central Moral Tradition
of Lawyering, 58 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 491, 492–93 (2008) (footnotes omitted).
68. See, e.g., Monroe H. Freedman, Client Confidences and Client Perjury: Some
Unanswered Questions, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1939 (1988); Monroe H. Freedman, In
Praise of Overzealous Representation—Lying to Judges, Deceiving Third Parties, and
Other Ethical Conduct, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 771 (2006); Monroe H. Freeman, Professional
Responsibility of the Criminal Defense Lawyer: The Three Hardest Questions, 64 MICH.
L. REV. 1469 (1966).
69. See Freedman, Legal Ethics from a Jewish Perspective, supra note 63, at
1136–37; Freedman, The Life-Saving Exception, supra note 63.
70. See Freedman, Legal Ethics from a Jewish Perspective, supra note 63:
I have written extensively for thirty years about the need to change the existing
rules to conform with the constitutional and religious ideals that I believe in.
One of many examples is the rule that forbids a lawyer to reveal a confidence
in order to save an innocent human life. I have long argued that the rule should
be changed to protect innocent life, and I drafted the first rule permitting a lawyer
to use a confidence for that purpose. This is consistent with the sanctity of life
in Jewish tradition, which is illustrated in the familiar Mishnahic discussion of
the death penalty (involving, by hypothesis, a guilty person, not an innocent
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Notably, Freedman’s coauthor, Abbe Smith, disagrees with Freedman’s
position, contending that “it is more important to maintain and preserve
the principle of confidentiality . . . than it is to affirm individual lawyer
morality.”71 Significantly, in others contexts, Smith has likewise described
the way her religious faith informs her lawyering.72 Thus, the debate
between Freedman and Smith need not indicate an unbridgeable gap in
perspectives, but again a difference in emphasis. Both scholars take
seriously the duty of confidentiality and the duty to the ethical self, as
well as a duty to justice. They differ as to which of the conflicting duties
should take precedence in the case of the innocent convict.
V. CONCLUSION
This essay has drawn on the work of Fred Zacharias to suggest that
competing models of the lawyer’s role, including an ethical duty to self,
need not be viewed as incompatible expressions of ethical monism.
Instead, relying on the preamble and comments to the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct, the essay proposes a framework that recognizes a
three-tiered approach to the lawyer’s professional responsibilities,
consisting of the duty to the client, the duty to justice, and the duty to
self. This framework provides a means for analyzing ethical dilemmas,
on both descriptive and normative levels, taking into account a range of
competing responsibilities that arise in legal practice.
Through the example of the lawyer’s duty of confidentiality, an area
that Fred addressed repeatedly throughout his scholarship, the essay
employs the three-tiered framework to identify points of contention that
divide different lawyering models. In this perspective, each model may
be viewed as emphasizing one aspect of the lawyer’s ethical duties,
while at the same time acknowledging, rather than rejecting outright, the
one). It was said that a Sanhedrin that puts a man to death once in seven years is
called a murderous one. Rabbi Eleazar ben Azariah emended that to read, “or
even once in 70 years.” And Rabbi Tarfon and Rabbi Akiba added that if they
had been in the Sanhedrin, no death sentence would ever have been passed.
Id. at 1136–37 (footnote omitted); see also MONROE H. FREEDMAN & ABBE SMITH,
UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS’ ETHICS 152–54 (3d ed. 2004). For further analysis of the
Mishnaic discussion, see Samuel J. Levine, Capital Punishment in Jewish Law and Its
Application to the American Legal System: A Conceptual Overview, 29 ST. MARY’S L.J.
1037, 1044–52 (1998).
71. FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra note 70, at 154.
72. Abbe Smith & William Montross, The Calling of Criminal Defense, 50
MERCER L. REV. 443 (1999).
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importance of other ethical obligations and considerations. This
recognition may help facilitate more illuminating dialogue and debate
among adherents of various models.
Finally, the essay looks at Monroe Freedman as an example of a
scholar who stands as an outspoken proponent of the duty of zealous
advocacy, but who likewise maintains a dedication to an ethical duty to
self, which at times outweighs the interests of the client. Admiring
Freedman’s ability to incorporate morality into his vision of counseling
clients, Fred declared that “[a] lawyer who implements a client-oriented
role as an excuse not to think in moral terms misunderstands the thrust
of the theory.”73
Indeed, it may be particularly fitting to invoke Freedman in closing
this essay tribute to the memory of Fred Zacharias. In one of his final
articles, published posthumously, Fred emphasized the influence of
academic scholarship on the work of lawyers: “[A]cademic debate . . . is
important, even when it proves to be incomplete. Practitioners and
professional code drafters need help identifying lines that are finer than
the ones in the current professional rules or current conceptions of the
lawyer’s role.”74 At the end of the article, after identifying Freedman as
an academic who influenced the drafting of modern professional codes,
Fred concluded: “The influence of high theory may take time to
percolate down to the bar, but the influence is present. So long as
practitioners are willing to engage with academia, lawyers and scholars
can work together to make practical progress.”75
In the course of his remarkable career, from his work on
confidentiality to his insights into the lawyer’s duty to self, Fred
Zacharias addressed nearly every significant issue related to legal ethics
and the practice of law. In remembering Fred, we will continue to turn
to his valuable legacy of scholarship, which will remain important and
influential for academics and practitioners alike.

73. Fred C. Zacharias, Practice, Theory, and the War on Terror, 59 EMORY L.J.
333, 354 (2009).
74. Id. at 366.
75. Id. at 368.
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